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Abstract The aim of this article is to reconstruct Bochen´ski’s method of philo-
sophical analysis as well as to clarify the purpose of that method and its basic
elements. In the second part of the paper I will compare Bochen´ski’s method with
the methods of modern applied ontology.
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Introduction
J.M. Bochen´ski conducted benchmark analyses of a number of concepts belonging
to different domains, such as authority, religion, the free society, the industrial
enterprise. In these analyses Bochen´ski applied a method he developed himself, in
which logical tools were of vital importance. In the article I will reconstruct the
purpose of that method and its basic elements. In the second part of the paper I will
compare Bochen´ski’s method with the methods of modern applied ontology.
Bochen´ski: between logic and ontology
Bochen´ski’s philosophical activity can be briefly described as philosophical analysis (or
its result as analytic philosophy). In his programmatic statement, presented in ‘‘U¨ber die
analytische Philosophie’’ (Bochen´ski 1986a), ‘‘Logic and Ontology’’ (Bochen´ski
1974c) and in numerous observations contained usually in the introductions to his
analytic works, Bochen´ski insisted that he cultivated a kind of basic research, which
seeks to understand what other disciplines presuppose. It is analytic philosophy, in
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which one conducts ‘‘a simple, sober, logical analysis of language. […] Therefore,
analytic philosophy is primarily an analysis of language, words are indeed not taken into
account here in the abstract sense, i.e. in isolation from the living language. On the
contrary, different ways of using words are explored to determine their meaning better.
That is to say, however, that these meanings are determined by continuous comparison
with the reality reflected in language’’ (Bochen´ski 1974a, p. 12).
The program of practicing analytic philosophy can be summarized in the
following schema: a philosopher, using the tools of logic (the consequence of the
use of logic is simplicity and sobriety), performs linguistic analysis based on the
examination of words in ordinary language in order to grasp their meaning; such an
approach assumes, of course, the correspondence of language and reality (which is
reflected in language).
Philosophical analysis is of a logical character. Therefore, philosophy adopts,
according to Bochen´ski, the form of applied logic. ‘‘This may seem strange to a
reader who regards logic as a reasoning technique. In fact, logic is a completely
different thing; it is above all a theory of the most general, simplest connections
between all things, and thus a great tool not as much for reasoning as for analysis’’
(Bochen´ski 1974a, 12). It is worth mentioning that Bochen´ski pointed to three
important functions of logic in philosophy, namely: the educational function
(paidagogos), the instrumental function (organon), and the informational function
(meros), by means of which some logical statements lead to the solution of
philosophical problems. However, the most important function of logic is its use as
a tool for the analysis of concepts (Russell’s theory of descriptions, Tarski’s theory
of truth or his own conceptual analyses serving as examples) (Bochen´ski 1988a, b).
Bochen´ski’s analytic papers are in line with the program of Polish analytic
philosophy initiated by K. Twardowski and J. Łukasiewicz, whose followers include,
among others, T. Kotarbin´ski, K. Ajdukiewicz, and T. Cze _zowski. In the paper
‘‘Analiza i konstrukcja poje˛cia przyczyny’’ (Łukasiewicz 1961, 9–65) Łukasiewicz
distinguished two operations aimed at the determination of the concept: analysis and
construction. ‘‘To provide a logical analysis of a concept, or an abstract object is to find
all its features and explore the relationships that occur between them, with a particular
emphasis on the necessary relationships, that is on the designation of both defining and
consecutive characteristics’’ (Łukasiewicz 1961, 12). But, as he noted, it is not
possible to provide all the features of a given concept, because besides absolute
features, it has an unlimited number of relative features. An additional difficulty stems
from the fact that in everyday language we use the word corresponding to the concept
in various situations usually knowing which thing we have in mind. Therefore, to
obtain the definition of a concept the analysis must be supplemented with a structural
element. ‘‘To create, or construct, an abstract object means to find certain features, to
consider which of them can be connected with each other, and which should be
removed, and thereby to obtain a complete collection of features connected by
relationships that would constitute precisely the object of research’’ (Łukasiewicz
1961, p. 13).1 Thus, according to Łukasiewicz, the meaning of a word in ordinary
1 S. Kamin´ski distinguishes the following conceptions of philosophical analysis (derived from ‘‘classical
analysts, not school related authors’’): (1) treating the analysis as a definitional-explanatory operation; (2)
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language is to be reconstructed, and the determination of the meaning of a name should
resemble efforts towards providing a regulatory definition.
Bochen´ski, as we will show by studying examples of his analysis of concepts,
applied Łukasiewicz’s program. Philosophical analysis aims at defining clearly the
concepts used in other disciplines. Modern development helps philosophers
recognize that they can do a favor for other disciplines, that not only they alone
but others can utilize their results. In the Middle Ages there was much discussion
about the role of philosophy as ancilla theologiae. Many modern philosophers
found that offensive—How could their dignified wisdom be a servant? Their
indignation might not have been as radical had they heard the term ‘auxiliary’
instead of ‘servant’ discipline– since such is the meaning of the medieval ‘ancilla’.
None of the mathematicians feels offended by the fact that an astronomer uses his
science as an auxiliary discipline. Why would philosophers react differently?
(Bochen´ski 1993, 46).
Philosophy is to be a propaedeutic to the domains of specific sciences (Aristotle
attributed this role to the Organon) Bochenski listed four distinctive features of
analytic philosophy—focusing on small tasks (rather than creating syntheses); clear
expression; relying on logical tools; objectivity—allow philosophical propaedeutic
to be seen as neutral in content. That neutrality is due to the fact that the analysis is
carried out solely in order to determine the basic properties of the analyzed concept
(Bochen´ski 1974a, p. 13), and philosophical analysis is based on the most general
categories of ontology (and ontologically understood logic) (Bochen´ski 1974c,
285–288).
In the next section we will present the way to implement Bochen´ski’s method.
The key stages of the analysis of a concept will be extracted on the basis of the
analysis of the concept of authority. Since the object of this paper is concept
analysis, we omit other papers by Bochen´ski on formalization, such as those on the
formal analysis of the arguments for the existence of God.2
Footnote 1 continued
limiting the analysis to a (syntactic) reduction of formulas, and (3) identifying the analysis with a
linguistic and pragmatic study of the ways to apply formulas. Apparently, reductive analysis is closest to
Łukasiewicz’s and Bochen´ski’s programs; according to Kamin´ski, ‘‘assuming isomorphy between atomic
sentences and the corresponding elementary facts, the analysis is carried out bringing complex and
descriptive ontological statements to the language of logic, which allows for a deeper and clearer insight
into the structure of the world’’; cf. Kamin´ski (1993, 135–136), J. Wolen´ski indicates the following
methods of analytic philosophy: the method of logical construction, Carnap’s method of explication,
Ajdukiewicz’s method of paraphrase, the method of presupposition and argumentation from reference
cases; Bochen´ski’s approach would probably be closest to the method of logical constructions or to that of
paraphrases, cf Wolen´ski (1989).
2 I focus mainly on the book Was ist Autorita¨t (Bochen´ski 1974a) and related articles, with references to
other works by Bochen´ski.
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Conceptual analysis applied to the concept of authority
Bochen´ski uses the above mentioned program to the fullest in the analysis of the
concept of authority (Bochen´ski, ‘‘Was is Autorita¨t?,’’ ‘‘An Analysis of Authority,’’
‘‘On authority’’). The paper ‘‘Was is Autorita¨t?’’ is written in ordinary language, but
it was preceded by an analysis carried out in formal language in the article ‘‘An
Analysis of Authority.’’3 In the latter work Bochen´ski notes that ‘‘what is offered
here is an analysis which is, in most cases, purely logical, more exactly pragmatic,
but conducted with formal logical tools. However, a few empirical assumptions are
made. Those assumptions are valid only where human authority is concerned,
consequently, the portions of our study based on them deal with that authority alone.
On the other hand, whatever is not based on those assumptions applies to all
possible entities, i.e. to God also. A theory of every possible authority is
constructed.’’ (Bochen´ski 1974b, 56). The analysis of ‘authority’ is based, at least
partly, on empirical assumptions (meaning: ‘extra-logical’), because it is related to a
concept from outside logic, namely a concept from ethics or epistemology; it has an
ontological character—it applies to every possible authority, and is carried out with
the use of logical tools. Those are from first order logic; in his work Bochen´ski
rather does not refer to logical means from outside Principia Mathematica.
The primary objective of the analysis of a concept is to formulate a definition.
According to Bochen´ski, it is to be a classical definition, that is, through specifying
genus proximum and differentia specifica. The adoption of the classical definition as
the objective of the analysis results in view that the aim of analysis a logical division
of the concept’s extension.
In Bochen´ski’s analysis of the concept of authority we can distinguish the
following stages:
1. Reference to the meaning of the analyzed expression in a natural language
(everyday language or professional jargon). The starting point is an introduc-
tory analysis related to the everyday use of the word ‘‘authority.’’ Bochen´ski
here goes back to the colloquial phrases containing the expression ‘‘authority,’’
pointing to the ambiguity of the word: it can be understood in the sense of
something that is an attribute of someone (feature) or something that has the
nature of a relationship (one is an authority for someone).4
2. Organizing intuitions associated with the use of an appropriate natural language
concept. This requires differentiating the various meanings of the word by
distinguishing different contexts of its use.
3 (Bochen´ski 1974b). In that article Bochen´ski indicates that the analysis is an extension of some of the
statements contained in Logic of Religion.
4 Similar remarks can be found for example in ‘‘Analyse der industriellen Unternehmung,’’ (Vortrag
gehalten am 18. Ma¨rz 1985, Bank Hofmann AG, 1985; in Bochen´ski 1988b, 119–150), where the author
draws attention to the fact that the concept of a company is such that ‘‘Es sieht so aus, als ob eine
Definition der Unternehmung im allgemeinen, das heißt eine eindeutige Bestimmung des Sinnes des
Wortes ‘‘Unternehmung’’, nicht mo¨glich wa¨re’’ (120). Due to the lack of the possibility to refer to
colloquial language in which intuitions concerning understanding an enterprise are unclear, the author
examines various economic conceptions of an enterprise.
20 M. Lechniak
123
3. Finding the closest kind, that is, the specific locus ontologicus of the concept, or
establishing the category to which the examined concept belongs. In the case of
the concept of authority the category of relationship rather than the category of
property is the genus.5 Consequently, the analysis of the genus ‘relation’ is
reduced to determining how many components it has and analyzing the
components of that relation (in the case of property—the analysis of its
subject),6 including the determination of the ontological category of the
relation’s components. For the relation of authority the components are: the
subject of authority (person with authority), the object of authority (the person
for whom one is an authority) and an domain of authority (i.e. a set of
statements or directives concerning authority).
4. Determining formal properties of a relation that will distinguish the relation of
being an authority from other ternary relations, and will thus somehow serve as
the differentiae specificae. Both in order to define genus as a relation, and,
above all, to determine the terms of property relations, a formal theory of
relations is particularly helpful.
5. Introducing a division within the analyzed concept. Logical division of the
extension of a concept (name) must be preceded by a search for the principle of
the division. Thus, after determining the properties of the divided concept its
more extensive determination is acquired by means of a logical division: the
search for the principle of the division is based on the discovery of a property
that assumes at least two modifications determining individual components of
the division. Bochen´ski divides ‘authority’ according to the type of objects
belonging to the realm of authority. For the concept of authority these are
propositions (statements in a logical sense) and directives (norms) ordering
such and such an action. Thus, if statements make up the realm, we have
epistemic authority (concerning the truth of the propositions), and if directives
make up the realm, in that case we have deontic authority (concerning the
recommended actions of the object of authority).
6. Analyzing individual components of the division. The analysis begins with
attempts to define the essence of each of the components of the division and
presenting the properties of the defined concepts. For example, for the concept
of deontic authority it is important to distinguish between two types of
authority—sanctions and solidarity. That distinction is based on the principle
that the purpose of the object of authority may be consistent with the objective
5 The concept of authority shares the fate of many ‘shortcut concepts’ in which a relational phrase gets
‘‘wound down’’ to a property phrase (analogous to saying that Joanna is a mother; but the phrase, ‘‘is a
mother’’ is relational, because Joanna is the mother of someone. In such cases, one can speak secondarily
about the feature ‘‘is a mother’’: x is a mother if there exists y such that x is a woman and x is in the
relation of being a mother towards y).
6 Sometimes the genus of a given kind is of a complex character, beyond Aristotle’s list of categories, as,
for example, in ‘‘Analyse der industriellen Unternehmung’’ where Bochen´ski points out that the classical
categories are not suitable to identify adequately the genus of the genre ’enterprise’. ‘‘Sto¨ßt man in der
Suche nach der Gattung auf solche Schwierigkeiten, dann soll man—einem alten methodologischen
Ratschlag folgend—‘‘die Leiter der Abstraktion hochklettern’’, das heißt, zu immer abstrakteren
Begriffen aufsteigen, bis zu den allgemeinsten u¨berhaupt, den Kategorien. (…) Kategorien gibt es
na¨mlich im wesentlichen drei: Ding, Eigenschaft und Beziehung’’ (Bochen´ski 1988b, 122).
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of the subject of authority (authority of solidarity) or inconsistent (authority of
sanctions).
Those points define the various stages of the analysis of the concept of authority.
Sometimes the process of defining is different. For example, in ‘‘The concept of the
free society’’ Bochen´ski, while defining the concept of individual freedom, refers to
the pre-defined notion of authority; then, following a combinatorial analysis of
various possible types of society distinguished in terms of its relation to the freedom
of an individual, he seeks to provide an adequate definition of a free society by
setting down, first, a necessary, then a sufficient condition for a free society.7 Of
course, the above steps are not always present and not always in exactly the same
order.
Now it is worth looking at the means of formal logic to which Bochen´ski had
recourse in his analysis.
Means of formal logic used in philosophical analysis
Symbolization and the language of first order predicate calculus with identity
The procedure of symbolization is crucial for Bochen´ski’s analysis, he clearly
distinguishes symbolization, that is, writing down relevant extra-logical theorems in
symbolic language, from formalization: ‘‘Regarding logical symbolism, it must be
stressed that the use of artificial symbols is not to be understood as a formalization.
For formalization is a procedure by which one abstracts from the meaning of terms
and operates on the shapes of the (material) symbols alone—which will not be done
here. The symbolism is rather used as a useful shorthand, without which it would be
difficult to obtain statements of the desired precision’’ (Bochen´ski 1986b, 207).
Certainly, when deciding on formalized equivalents of extra-logical expressions you
need to choose a formal language in which the symbolization will be executed. The
choice of language determines which theses can be expressed in it and with which
degree of precision. The formal language used by Bochen´ski is the language of first
order predicate calculus with identity. Many relationships between the properties of
the analyzed concepts are derived from the laws of the predicate logic. Bochen´ski
uses neither non-classical logics in his language analyses, nor, for example,
Les´niewski’s systems. According to Bochen´ski, the means of classical logic are
sufficient for a formal account of philosophical theses under analysis.8
7 See Bochen´ski (1986b). When determining the concept of the free society Bochen´ski follows the
following steps: specifying the necessary condition for the free society, strengthening the necessary
condition by adding a new condition, further restricting the analysis to specific cases and exceptions.
8 This does not rule out the fact that he knew and respected some non-classical logics, for example he
mentions Łukasiewicz, Heyting, and Les´niewski as authors who articulated the carefully refined




Bochen´ski devoted a lot of attention to the logical theory of relations, because many
of the concepts he studied are relations. The article ‘‘An analysis of authority’’ is a
contribution to the theory of ternary relations. Bochen´ski shows there that for
ternary relations the distinction: domain—range loses its meaning: one should talk
instead about three domains, and that ternary relations are reducible to binary
relations.9 He also defines some properties of ternary relations indicating that a
given property of a relation (e.g., its symmetry) can hold in a number of ways.10
Multiple components of the analyzed relations (for example, the concept of
authority or a free society) presuppose the method of formal analysis, named by
Bochen´ski ‘‘generalization.’’
Generalization
In Polish methodology generalization used to be referred to as an operation on the
intension of a name, aiming at finding the name of a range broader then the given
name.11 Bochen´ski uses the term in a slightly different sense, generalization being
quantification over variables that are the arguments of a predicate denoting a
relation. ‘‘By listing them, we obtain a logical frame for a classification of different
societies in regard to freedom. Such a classification can only be made with the use
of contemporary mathematical (Fregean) formal logic, which alone (contrary to the
so-called ‘conventional’ logic) offers a theory of multiple quantification. Such
quantification is needed here, because we have to operate on a matrix with two
variables.’’ (Bochen´ski 1986b, 208). It is therefore a formal generalization,
involving finding for each relation all of its generalizations, understood as
identifying all possible claims of a general nature (i.e. both with a general and
specific quantification) concerning the subject of the analyzed relation holding
between certain classes of objects (its components). The aim of such a procedure is
a kind of combinatorial analysis leading to a review of all the possible types of
concepts corresponding to a given relation. Obviously, some generalizations are
reducible to others because of the laws for quantifiers.12 Sometimes, for example in
9 These are: the relation of a subject to the object of authority [that is a set of ordered pairs x, y, such that
there exists a domain c such that A (x, y, c)], a subject to the domain and the object to the domain and
their converses.
10 There can exist twelve such notions of symmetry for a ternary relation. For the relation of authority,
however, there are fewer—only two, because the third component, the domain, belongs to a different
logical type than the first two, and there is no point rearranging the order of the individuum—a set, see
Bochen´ski (1974b), 61.
11 According to Cze _zowski, generalization is a logical addition, e.g. for the name ‘‘square’’ we can find a
superior type, ‘‘a square or inequilateral rectangular parallelogram.’’ ‘‘The transformation carried out on
the term ‘square’ replaces the component ‘equilateral’ in its connotation with a logical sum, ‘equilateral
or inequilateral’’’; cf. Cze _zowski (2009), 96.
12 That is, the laws of changing the order of quantifiers. Thus, for example, the number 48 generalizations
of three variables is, by the aforementioned laws, limited to 26. These in turn are mutually connected by
entailment relations under the laws of subordination, that is 8xA xð Þ ! 9xA xð Þ or the law of interchanging
existential quantifiers with general quantifiers, i.e. 9x8yP x; yð Þ ! 8y9xP x; yð Þ.
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the article ‘‘The concept of the free society,’’ such an analysis is beneficial, showing
mutual logical relations between different types of freedom in society, because
‘‘each of these generalizations describes the structure of one of the a priori possible
simple types of societies in regard to freedom’’ (Bochen´ski 1986b, p 209). Similarly,
for the concept of authority we can examine the relationships among various
positions, for example with regard to the issue of epistemic authority, thanks to the
analysis of the relations among ‘‘generalizations.’’
Logical theorems and extralogical theorems
The analyses of concepts presented by Bochen´ski are, as already indicated, of a
philosophical nature and therefore, generally speaking, extralogical. Bochen´ski is
trying to show the way of justifying the proposed statements (as, for example, in
‘‘An analysis of authority’’), but often, especially in the papers free of symbolic
notation (e.g. ‘‘What is authority?’’), in the proofs Bochen´ski provided of his
statements it is difficult to distinguish the purely logical from the extralogical
means, such as empirical observations or intuition. It should also be noted that the
introduced definitions usually take the form of statements of the system rather than
rules of substitution. Bochen´ski treats them as real definitions and tries to justify
them intuitively. Many other statements are logical consequences of the definitions,
and in Bochen´ski’s papers one can find theses, which he treats as axioms, for
example, the existence axiom for the theory of authority: ‘‘Everyone is an authority
in at least one field for everyone else’’ (i. e., in symbolic notation):13
8x9c8y x 6¼ y ! A x; y; cð Þð Þ:
Philosophical analysis and formal applied ontology
As shown above, Bochen´ski treated practicing philosophy as a logical analysis of
concepts (in a broad sense). Its objective is the definition of concepts vital for
specific non-philosophical disciplines to ensure their accuracy and terminological
precision. The analysis is thus understood as prescientific, a kind of propaedeutic to
science. How does analytic philosophy in Bochen´ski’s understanding relate to
contemporary formal ontology?
Contemporary formal ontology is characterized as ‘‘the result of combining the
intuitive, informal method of classical ontology with the formal, mathematical
method of modern symbolic logic. Formal ontology, the result of combining these
two methods, is the systematic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all
forms and modes of being’’ (Cocchiarella 1991, 640). Bochen´ski applied both the
intuitive method and the methods of formal logic. So he fulfilled the first part of
Cocchiarella’s characterization. However, the result of the research in formal
13 Bochen´ski notes here that ‘‘all [theorems] are based on experience and can not be obtained by
linguistic analysis alone. However, the acceptance of only one directly based on experience is necessary




ontology should be, according to Cocchiarella, a logical axiomatic formal system.
Bochen´ski’s analysis did not go so far, stopping at the pre-formalized stage.
Bochen´ski did not provide an axiomatic system and applied his analysis to fairly
narrowly defined problems. According to him, the analysis was not meant to provide
a comprehensive system of all the forms and ways of being, but merely lead to
precision in the use of certain concepts applied in other fields of knowledge. Was
thus Bochen´ski the forerunner of applied ontology?
There are today many applied ontologies (Garbacz and Trypuz 2012). Applied
ontology is to be a ‘‘specification of conceptualization,’’ which means that as a
conceptualization it is a simplified and abstract view of the world, expressed in a
language (specification) by logical means.14 Its purpose is thus a formal character-
ization of the conceptual apparatus of a specific subject area (while the attributive
‘‘engineering’’ indicates that the first goal of this ontology is practical utility and not
full adequacy or simplicity). Some of these ontologies are complex systems containing
many conceptual categories and the relations binding them on the basis of which
specific programming tools can be constructed. In the light of that fact someone might
deem Bochen´ski’s achievements unimportant. But one should keep in mind that
Bochen´ski’s works come from the 70s and 80s of the last century, and applied
ontologies started developing much later. Applied ontologies were created for
technical purposes and entire research teams have been working on them.
Unfortunately, the lack of technical applications for the developed concepts is the
reason why Bochen´ski’s analyses should be treated as prolegomena to the
appropriate applied ontologies.15 The demand for ‘‘working’’ ontologies, that is,
those which provide foundations for representing practical knowledge, obliges
systems developed for practical reasons to face a number of particular problems.
Therefore, some of the results presented by Bochen´ski may seem to be too ‘‘thick’’
since they do not take into account the achievements of particular scientific
disciplines. For example, the results of the analysis of authority may be subject to
allegations by sociologists and social psychologists who, should they try to apply
this theory, probably would notice the many problems left unrefined or Bochenski’s
disregard for the requirements of applicability.
When it comes to comparing Bochen´ski’s achievements with formal ontologies
in terms of the attitude towards logical tools, it can be said that applied ontologies
often take the form of elaborate definitional–axiomatic systems. A number of non-
contradictory axioms are used which are often dependent on each other; because
mutual independence is not an important feature of the system, formal logicians
have often criticized such systems as inelegant. But their purpose is to characterize
reasonably accurately the concepts of a domain. Although the language of these
systems is essentially a first order language, it happens to go beyond that language
by using, for example, mereology. In Bochen´ski’s work, as we have indicated, we
have more of an intuitive analysis supported by the language of first order logic, it is
14 As an example of an applied ontology we can cite the ontology of beliefs contained in Garbacz et al.
(2009).
15 Although Bochen´ski’s theory of authority goes well beyond the content expressed symbolically and
can be the basis for a large broad ontology of authority.
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an analysis at a pre-formalized stage—the language of logic supports the precision
of the definitional actions and enables the derivation of basic logical relations
among concepts. The result of the analysis does not take the form of an axiomatic
system but, at most, the form of a set of statements and definitions related by the
content and form.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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